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ASKING THE IMPOSSIBLE: THE NEGLIGENCE
LIABILITY OF THE MENTALLY ILL
Elizabeth J. Goldstein*
[Due to the sudden onset of incapacity, the defendant lost con-
trol of his car.] He did not recall the accident but his last recol-
lection before it, was leaving a stop light after his last stop, and
his first recollection after the accident was being taken out of his
car in plaintiffs' shop.'
Is the defendant liable for negligence? In most jurisdictions, the out-
come of this hypothetical situation is contingent upon the nature of the
illness. If the defendant was physically ill, he will prevail. If the defend-
ant was mentally ill, he will lose. Under modem tort law, a mentally ill
individual who cannot meet the reasonable person standard will be found
negligent regardless of fault.
Many commentators have severely criticized this rule, arguing that the
objective standard, created in the seventeenth century, is incompatible
with modem views and treatment of the mentally ill.2 These commenta-
tors advocate that the mentally ill should be held to a subjective standard
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Law, J.D. 1994. The author is presently clerking for the Honorable A. Franklin Burgess,
Jr. in the District of Columbia Superior Court. The author is indebted to Professors Daniel
J. Givelber and Alexander Greer for their helpful suggestions and comments. The author,
would also like to thank the Honorable A. Franklin Burgess, Jr., District of Columbia
Superior Court, and the Honorable Morton I. Greenberg, United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. The author has had the pleasure of learning from these two great
judicial minds.
1. Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 740 (Ct. App. 1971).
2. See, e g., Robert M. Ague, Jr., The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60
DicK. L. REv. 211 (1956); see also Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Torts of Infants and
Insane Persons, 23 MicH. L. REv. 9 (1924); W.G.H. Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to
Tort, 21 COLUM. L. 1Ev. 333 (1921); William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill
and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIo ST. L.". 52 (1960); James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of
Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 1079 (1981); Win. B. Hornblower,
Insanity and the Law of Negligence, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 278 (1905); David E. Siedelson,
Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Men-
tally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. RFv. 17, 38-44 (1981);
Win. J. Wilkinson, Mental Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability, 17 RocKY MTN. L.
REv. 38 (1944); William R. Casto, Comment, The Tort Liability of Insane Persons In Negli-
gence: A Critique, 39 TENN. L. REv. 705 (1972).
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in negligence actions. Recently, however, a number of scholars have ar-
gued for the maintenance of the seventeenth century standard, asserting
that this standard promotes important societal goals, is more efficient,3
and is consistent with the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence.4
This article examines and rejects these theories for the objective stan-
dard. Instead, this article advocates the adoption of a limited objective
standard which would relieve individuals of liability who, due to mental
illness, cannot ex ante prevent their own negligence. Part I of this article
introduces the origins of the application of the objective standard to the
mentally ill in tort cases, documenting the internally contradictory case
law that serves as the historical foundation for the objective standard.
Part II presents the current state of the law. Part III, "Novel Rationales
For The Objective Standard: Efficiency & Therapeutic Goals," examines
recent justifications for the objective standard. Part IV, "Harmonizing
Negligence Law: Youth, Physical Maladies, and Mental Illness," describes
the negligence standards applicable to children and the physically inca-
pacitated and proposes the creation of a subjective standard to apply to
mentally ill people who are stricken with a sudden or untreatable mental
illness.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE OBJECrIVE STANDARD
A. Early History
The American rule, which holds the mentally ill to an objective stan-
dard in tort actions, originates from the dicta of a seventeenth century
English case, Weaver v. Ward.5 In Weaver, the defendant accidentally
wounded the plaintiff when the defendant misfired his musket during mil-
itary exercises. The court found in favor of the plaintiff, stating:
[Flor though it were agreed, that if men tilt or tumey in the
presence of the King, or if two masters of defence playing their
prizes kill one another, that this shall be no felony; or if a luna-
tick kill a man, or the like, because felony must be done animo
felonico: yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages ac-
cording to hurt or loss, it is not so; and therefore if a lunatick
3. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, TE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 312-13 (1987); discussion infra part III.A.
4. Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence And Tort Law: A Limited Subjective
Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REv. 409 (1992); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of
the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983).
5. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616); Ague, supra note 2, at 212; Bohlen, supra note 2, at
13; Cook, supra note 2, at 337; Ellis, supra note 2, at 1082.
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hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass: and therefore no
man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature of an
excuse, and not of a justification...) except it may be judged
utterly without his fault.
As if a man by force take my hand and strike you, or if here
the defendant had said, that the plaintiff had ran cross his piece
when it was discharging, or had set forth the case with the cir-
cumstances, so as it had appeared to the Court that had been
inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence
to give occasion to the hurt.6
Weaver has been relied upon by courts as the foundation for tort law's
standard for the mentally ill.7 Reliance on this seventeenth century case,
however, is misplaced for two reasons.8 First, the dicta in the case is in-
herently inconsistent. The court's paradoxical reasoning in Weaver lies in
the statement that the actor who is without fault will prevail. However,
the insane are accountable regardless of fault.9 The second problem in
relying on Weaver is that the court based its rationale on the predominant
tort theory of the day, strict liability. 10
The leading American case for the application of the objective stan-
dard to the mentally ill is Williams v. Hays." In Williams, the defendant
was a captain and part owner of a brig.' 2 Soon after the commencement
of the brig's voyage, a storm erupted requiring the captain to stay on
deck continuously for two days.' 3 When the captain eventually became
exhausted, he went back to his quarters, took quinine, and rested.'4 The
ship's rudder then broke, and the vessel's mate told the captain to return
6. Weaver, 80 Eng. Rep. at 284 (emphasis added).
7. Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 470 (Conn. 1988); Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294
A.2d 338,339 (Conn. C.P. 1972); Vosnos v. Perry, 357 N.E.2d 614,615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976);
McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (III. 1887); Bohlen, supra note 2, at 16.
8. Cook, supra note 2, at 337. Perhaps courts have unduly relied on Weaver because
very few American tort cases have examined whether insanity could serve as a defense in
negligence cases. Curran, supra note 2, at 64.
9. See Ague, supra note 2, at 212-13; Bohlen, supra note 2, at 16; Cook, supra note 2,
at 335; Pamela Picher, The Tortious Liability of the Insane in Canada, 13 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 193, 203 (1975).
10. See Ague, supra note 2, at 212; Bohlen, supra note 2, at 16; Picher, supra note 9, at
204; Casto, supra note 2, at 705.
11. 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894), rev'd, 52 N.E. 589 (N.Y. 1899); Casto, supra note 2, at
718. Williams v. Hays was "so frequently cited that mention of it [was] even made in the
completely unrelated Palsgraf case." Ague, supra note 2, at 215 (footnote omitted); Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928).
12. Williams, 38 N.E. at 449.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 449-50.
1995]
70 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:67
to the deck. 5 The captain came on deck, but refused to believe that the
ship was in peril.16 Hence, he declined the assistance of two tug boats.'
7
The storm then demolished the ship which had drifted ashore.'" The in-
surance company paid for the damages, and its assignee sued the captain
of the brig, alleging carelessness and misconduct.' 9
During the trial, the captain asserted that he was insane during the voy-
age, and thus, not liable.20 The trial judge instructed the jury to find for
the plaintiff unless they found the defendant insane during the voyage.2'
After the jury found in favor of the defendant,' the plaintiff appealed.
In reversing the judgment, the New York Court of Appeals held that in-
sanity was not a defense to negligence. The court stated: "The general
rule is that an insane person is just as responsible for his torts as a sane
person,. . . the actor is responsible, although he acted with a good and
even laudable purpose .... "2 3 However, the court further explained:
If the defendant had become insane solely in consequence of his
efforts to save the vessel during the storm, we would have had a
different case to deal with. He was not responsible for the
storm, and while it was raging his efforts to save the vessel were
tireless and unceasing; and, if he thus became mentally and
physically incompetent to give the vessel any further care, it
might be claimed that his want of care ought not to be attributed
to him as a fault.
24
The New York Court of Appeals then remanded the case for a new
trial.25 The trial judge granted a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
According to the trial court, even if the defendant's condition "was the
result of exhaustion, caused by his efforts to save the ship from the perils
of the storm, and the heavy dose of quinine which he took as a remedy,"
it would not present an "exception to the principle laid down by the court
of appeals, that a person of unsound mind is responsible for the conse-
quences of acts which in the case of a sane person would be negligent.,
26







22. Id. at 449.
23. Id at 450.
24. Id. at 452.
25. Id at 453.
26. Williams v. Hays, 52 N.E. 589, 591 (N.Y. 1899).
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the plaintiff's judgment.27
The court via Justice Haight explained:
[T]he defendant was bound to exercise such reasonable care and
prudence as a careful and prudent man would ordinarily give to
his own vessel. What careful and prudent man could do more
than to care for his vessel until overcome by physical and mental
exhaustion? To do more was impossible. . . . [There is no
obligation to perform impossible things.2"
Accordingly, the court remanded the case and granted a new trial.2 9 Fol-
lowing this remand, the plaintiff finally dropped the suit.
30
While subsequent American courts have relied on Williams to stand for
the bright line rule that the mentally ill will be judged by the reasonable
person standard in negligence cases,31 the Williams case allowed the jury
to consider whether the defendant's duties on the ship caused him to be-
come mentally 11.32 In addition, the court based its reasoning upon a
distinction without an understandable difference. The court never ex-
plained why becoming insane from tireless work on a ship is legally dis-
tinct from other causes of insanity unrelated to fault.33 The Restatement
of Torts ("Restatement"), 4 like the New York Court of Appeals, has pro-
vided equally enigmatic reasoning for its position on the negligence liabil-
ity of the mentally ill.
B. The Evolution of the Restatement
The lack of clarity in the early cases may explain why the Restatement
(First) of Torts failed to provide an appropriate standard for the mentally
ill in negligence cases. It stated:
Unless the actor is a child or an insane person the standard of
27. l1t at 592.
28. Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
29. Id
30. Hornblower, supra note 2, at 293.
31. Campbell v. Bradbury, 176 P. 685,687 (Cal. 1918); Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348 (Kan.
1927) (citing Williams, 52 N.E. at 449) (providing that the great weight of authority is that
an insane person is civilly liable for his torts); Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 268 N.Y.S.
446, 448 (Mun. Ct. 1934); In re Meyer's Guardianship, 261 N.W. 211, 214 (Wis. 1935).
32. Ague, supra note 2, at 216; Hornblower, supra note 2, at 294.
33. Bohlen, supra note 2, at 25; Casto, supra note 2, at 719.
34. [The author's use of the word Restatement within the text of this article alludes to
the legal theories articulated by the American Law Institute in the Restatement (First) of
Torts (1934), the Supplement to the Restatement of Torts (1948), and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts (1965) as a whole. Specific references to particular versions of the Restate-
ment are also included within this text.]
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conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is
that of a reasonable man under like circumstances .... Caveat:
The institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane persons
are required to conform to the standard of behavior which soci-
ety demands of sane persons for the protection of the interests
of others.35
However, the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement of Torts ("Restatement
Supplement") deleted the phrase "or an insane person" from Section 283
and deleted the entire caveat.
36
Commentators differ on the reason for this initial change. One com-
mentator explains that the caveat was a tactful way of stating the Restate-
ment's support for judging the insane by a subjective standard.37 In
contrast, another commentator argues that the Restatement refused to
take a position on the subject until there was enough case law to merit
the adoption of a standard. 31 The Restatement Supplement supports the
latter opinion, stating that "[t]he original Caveat to this section... was
inserted because '[t]here is no sufficient authority to make it possible to
state a rule.'
39
When the Restatement adopted the reasonable person standard, the de-
cision was based on very little case law.4" In fact, the Restatement cited
only one case that found an insane person liable for negligence.41 The
Restatement also provided ten cases holding the mentally ill liable for in-
tentional torts.42 In explaining its illustrations, the Restatement asserted
35. R SATEMENT (FrnsT) OF ToRTs § 283 (1934).
36. REsTATEmENT OF TORTS § 283 (Supp. 1948).
37. Curran, supra note 2, at 53. Curran, however, does not explain why the Restate-
ment would not directly state its position.
38. See Ague, supra note 2, at 225.
39. REsTATEmENT OF TORTS § 283(ii) (Supp. 1948).
40. According to Justice Qua, as of 1937, there was not a "full and adequate discus-
sion" in the case law to decide whether the mentally ill should be held to an objective
standard in negligence actions. McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937).
41. REsrATEmENT OF TORTS § 283 (Supp. 1948). The case law relied upon was a New
York City municipal court decision. Id (citing Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 268 N.Y.S.
446 (Mun. Ct. 1934)). The Restatement Supplement also cited the dicta of several state
court cases. Id.
42. Id at § 283(ii) (citing Roberts v. Hayes, 1 N.E.2d 711 (Ill. 1936); Teopffer v. Teopf-
fer, 101 P.2d 904, 907 (Kan. 1940); Hackenberger v. Travelers Mut. Cas. Co., 62 P.2d 545,
547 (Kan. 1936); Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348 (Kan. 1927); Phillips' Committee v. Wards
Adm'r, 43 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1931); Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509 (La. Ct. App. 1934);
McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937); Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619 (N.C. 1938);
Sweeney v. Carter, 137 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1939); Shedrick v. Lathrop, 172 A. 630 (Vt.
1934)).
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that if courts held the insane liable for intentional torts 43 it would also
hold them liable for unintentional torts. It reasoned:
There seems to be no practical difference between the insane
person deliberately throwing the match in order to fire the stack
and his carelessly doing so, unmindful of the risk. In neither
case does he appreciate the seriousness of what he is doing or
evaluate its effect on others. He is equally free of moral blame-
worthiness in both cases and in both cases the same harm is suf-
fered. It seems clear that a court which would hold him [liable]
in the first case.., would also hold him liable in the second. It
also seems clear that courts . . . which have recently held an
insane person ... liable for intentionally injuring or killing an-
other would not hesitate to hold an insane person liable for
causing the same harm unintentionally."4
The Restatement's parity is unsound. The reasonableness of the de-
fendant's actions is not an issue in intentional tort cases. Traditional in-
tentional torts do not require the plaintiff to prove the unreasonableness
of the defendant's action except as a defense. One commentator aptly
explained the Restatement's view by stating:
[N]egligence is a lesser tort and liability is more easily estab-
lished. On the contrary, it seems to me a clear extension of the
theory of responsibility. To hold an insane person [liable] ... for
an intentional tort, a court can examine the rudiments of his
conduct, uncontrolled though it may be. To impose liability for
negligence, however, the court must blindly apply the objective
reasonable man standard. To apply the latter is in effect strict
liability upon the mentally ill and mentally deficient imposed
without examination of the circumstances of the act.
45
Additionally, the Restatement analogy eschewed the problem that many
cases based their decision, in part, on the premise that individuals should
be held strictly liable in tort.46 This premise directly contradicts the fault-
43. Id.
44. I&
45. Curran, supra note 2, at 65.
46. Seals, 254 P. at 349 ("There is no anomaly in compelling one who is not chargeable
with wrong intent to make compensation for an injury committed by him, for, as is said in
an early case, 'the reason is because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed."') (cita-
tions omitted); McGuire, 8 N.E.2d at 763 ("Fault is by no means at the present day a
universal prerequisite to liability, and the theory that it should be such has been obligated
very recently to yield at several points to what have been thought to be paramount consid-
erations of public good."); In re Meyer's Guardianship, 261 N.W. 211, 213-14 (Wis. 1935).
"'[I]n respect to a lunatic, as he has properly no will, it follows that the only proper mea-
sure of damages in an action against him for a wrong, is the mere compensation of the
1995]
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based foundation of the negligence system. The Restatement failed to ac-
knowledge that doctrinal deduction did not necessarily lead one to apply
the objective standard in negligence cases. Instead, the decision was one
of public policy. As one court explained:
This view [not holding the insane liable in tort] has plausibility,
and it would be perfectly sound and unanswerable if punishment
were the object of the law when persons unsound in mind are
the wrongdoers. But when we find that compensation for an
injury received is all that the law demands, the plausibility disap-
pears. Undoubtedly there is some appearance of hardship-
even of injustice-in compelling one to respond for that which,
for want of the control of reason, he was unable to avoid; that it
is imposing upon a person already visited with the inexpressible
calamity .... But the question of liability in these cases, as well
as in others, is a question of policy; and it is to be disposed of as
would be the question whether the incompetent person should
be supported at the expense of the public .... If his mental
disorder makes him dependent, and at the same time prompts
him to commit injuries, there seems to be no greater reason for
imposing upon the neighbors or the public one set of these con-
sequences rather than the other .... I
In insisting that legal doctrine requires the mentally ill to be held to the
reasonable person standard, the American Law Institute failed to provide
any policy rationale for its new mode of analysis.
Section 283B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts again stated the
strict rule that "[u]nless the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental
deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does
not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circum-
stances."'  In addition, in Comment b to Section 283, the American Law
Institute explained the reasons for the adoption of the objective standard
stating: (1) it would be too difficult to create a standard for civil insanity;
(2) insanity can be too easily feigned; (3) when two innocent persons are
harmed, the one who occasioned the harm should be found liable; and (4)
the objective standard would motivate those in charge of the insane's es-
tate to "look after them, keep them in order, and see that they do not do
party injured."' Id. (quoting Karow v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 N.W. 27,28 (1883)). "[O]n
the principle that where a loss must be borne by one of two innocent persons, it should be
borne by him who occasioned [the loss]."' Id (quoting Beels v. See, 10 Pa. 56,61 (1848)).
47. Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509,515 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (quoting THOMAS M. COo-
LEY, COOLEY ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 65 (4th ed. 1932)) (emphasis added) (finding a
mentally ill person not liable in tort under Louisiana civil law).
48. RES ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
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harm."4 9 Courts, in turn, have relied on the reasoning of the 1965 Re-
statement, holding the mentally ill to a reasonable person standard in tort
cases.50 Most commentators, however, have disagreed with the Restate-
ment's position.
C. Early Commentators
Earlier commentators argued that the American Law Institute's rea-
sons for establishing the objective standard were no longer legitimate.
Reasons for dismissing the traditional doctrine are discussed below.
1. Between Two Innocent People, the One Who Occasions the Harm
Should Be Liable for the Harm
As one commentator in 1956 explained, the American Law Institute's
reasoning "is nothing more than strict (or absolute) liability dressed up in
Sunday-go-to-meetin' garb. In the case of the lunatic, let's not drift back
into that unmoral abyss once again!",51 It is unfair to require only the
mentally ill to meet a strict liability standard while the average defendant
is only liable when she is at fault. Indeed, if the law's primary focus was
to compensate victims, then the doctrine of negligence should be dis-
carded for everyone, not only for the mentally illY.
2. Insanity Will Easily Be Feigned
Fear of widespread feigning of mental illness is unfounded. In the
crminal context, where there is arguably more incentive to feign mental
illness, defendants rarely invoke the insanity defense. On average, crimi-
nal defendants invoke the insanity defense in one to two percent of fel-
ony cases.5 3 This statistic is consistent with the Institute of Mental
Health's calculation that approximately one percent of the population of
49. Id at § 283B cmt. b.
50. Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 384 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986) (intentional tort), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1069 (1987); Williams v. Kearbey, 775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989)
(intentional tort); Stuyvesant Assocs. v. Doe, 534 A.2d 448, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987)
(gross negligence); Bell v. Busse, 633 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (intentional tort);
Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (negligence).
51. Ague, supra note 2, at 222; Bohlen, supra note 2, at 17; Ellis, supra note 2, at 1084.
52. Casto, supra note 2, at 716.
53. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas:
An Eight-State Study, 19 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PsYcHiATRY L. 331, 337 (1991); Jeffrey S. Ja-
nofsky et al., Defendants Pleading Insanity: An Analysis of Outcome, 17 BuLL. AM. ACAD.
PsycHnATRY L., 203, 205 (1989); Margaret A. McGreevy et al., The Negligible Effects of
California's 1982 Reform of the Insanity Defense Test, 148 AM. J. PsYCHiATRY 744, 746
(1991); Richard A. Pasewark & Deborah Seidenzahl, Opinions Concerning the Insanity
1995]
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the United States suffers from a chronic mental illness.54 Moreover, a
majority of people who plead the insanity defense are seriously mentally
ill." Ninety percent of those raising the criminal insanity defense are di-
agnosed with a mental illness, and a vast majority of these individuals
have been previously hospitalized due to mental illness.56 While approxi-
mately fifty-five percent of individuals who plead the insanity defense are
diagnosed with schizophrenia or another major mental illness, eighty-four
percent who are acquitted possess these diagnoses. 7 Accordingly, of
those criminal defendants who raise the insanity defense, the majority
who succeed with the defense are seriously mentally ill.58
In addition, the mentally ill have every reason not to feign insanity.
The defendant's testimony, relating to his or her mental illness, may be
introduced at a civil commitment or incompetence hearing.5 9 Thus, a de-
fense of mental illness in a negligence action may have a collateral effect
on an individual's freedom to live within society. Additionally, defend-
ants will be inhibited from using the insanity defense because of the social
stigma attached to mental illness.6"
3. It Is Too Difficult to Create and Apply a Civil Standard for
Insanity
Courts are reluctant to introduce into tort law the confusion and con-
troversy surrounding criminal insanity tests. Nevertheless, the judiciary
already applies a subjective standard to the mentally ill in issues of con-
tributory negligence,61 guardianship, civil commitment, and testamentary
Plea and Criminality Among Mental Patients, 7 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 199,201
(1979).
54. M. G. Bloche & Francine Cournos, Mental Health Policy for the 1990's: Tinkering
in Interstices, 15 J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L., 387. 388 (1980).
55. Callahan et al., supra note 53, at 337.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 336; McGreevy et al., supra note 53, at 747-48.
58. Callahan et al., supra note 53, at 337.
59. See Siedelson, supra note 2, at 39.
60. Id.; see also William R. Dubin, M.D. & Paul J. Fink, M.D., Effects of Stigma On
Psychiatric Treatment, in STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 3 (Paul Jay Fink, M.D. & Allan
Tasman, M.D. eds., 1992) ("While less than 3% of mentally ill patients could be catego-
rized as dangerous, 77% of mentally ill patients depicted on prime-time television are
presented as dangerous."); Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Compara-
tive Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 Am. PSYCHOL. 794, 794 (1984) (finding police officers
20% more likely to arrest individuals showing signs of mental illness than individuals com-
mitting crimes).
61. Baltimore & P. R. R. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232,238 (1900); Snider v. Callahan,
250 F.Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1966); De Martini v. Alexander Sanitarium, Inc., 13 Cal.
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capacity. 62
For example, in Mochen v. State,63 a seventeen-year-old mental patient
attempted to escape from a state mental hospital by lowering himself
from a window with tied bed sheets.' This failed attempt left the mental
patient with serious leg injuries causing him to be paralyzed.65 The
mental patient then sued the state. The trial court found in favor of the
state, holding that the mental patient was guilty of contributory negli-
gence.6 6 The appellate court reversed. 7 According to the court, the de-
fendant should be judged by a subjective standard of care because the
objective standard prevents accident compensation. 8 The court ex-
plained that a mentally ill person should not be "held to any greater de-
gree of care for his own safety than that which he is capable of
exercising." 69 To determine whether the plaintiff met this standard, the
court examined the hospital records and expert testimony.70 The plain-
tiff's medical records indicated that he had assaulted his mother, at-
tempted to assault his father, and had been diagnosed by his personal
physician as "sociopathic state vs. encephalopathic schizophrenia."7 " The
plaintiff's personal doctor testified at trial that the plaintiff was
psychotic.72 He also revealed to the court that although the plaintiff
could understand the risk of the escape, his mental condition made him
unable to resist the temptation to escape.73 "The frustration from what
[the plaintiff] considered unjust confinement was so intense that he re-
acted violently and impulsively and in his mind his elopement was an ap-
propriate and reasonable exercise of judgment."74 The court, in applying a
subjective standard, concluded that the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent.75
Rptr. 564, 566-67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Young v. State, 401 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956-57 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
62. Ellis, supra note 2, at 1089.
63. 352 N.Y.S.2d 290 (App. Div. 1974).
64. Id at 292.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id at 295.
68. Id
69. Id at 293.
70. Id at 294.
71. Id at 294-95.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id at 295 (emphasis added).
75. Id
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The Mochen case illustrates that courts can successfully apply the sub-
jective standard in negligence cases. The test created by the court,
whether the plaintiff exercised the level of care of which he was capable,
was applied by examining the plaintiff's medical records and analyzing
expert testimony.76 In addition, as noted in Breunig v. American Family
Insurance Co., 7 the court created a workable subjective standard in a
negligence action. The court found that a subjective standard would be
applied when "there [was] ... an absence of notice of forewarning to the
person that he may be suddenly subject to ... insanity or mental ill-
ness."7 In the criminal arena, it has been shown that juries do under-
stand how to apply the insanity test to the applicable facts.79 Indeed, it is
not evident that jurors will understand less about mental illness than
other substantive areas of knowledge needed to resolve a case (i.e., the
correct way to build a bridge or deliver a baby).
4. Liability Will Encourage Those in Charge of the Mentally ll's
Estate to Be More Responsible
The idea that the mentally ill have guardians who will protect them in
order to maintain the integrity of their estate has long been outdated.80
First, many mentally ill individuals have no estate to protect.8' A large
number of mentally ill persons rely solely on public assistance alone,
while others rely on handouts.' Approximately twenty-five to thirty per-
76. Id
77. 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970); see also infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text (pro-
viding an extensive discussion of Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co.).
78. Id at 623.
79. RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. ARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL As-
SESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST HINCKLEY ERA 134-35 (1988); RrrA J. SIMON,
THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 176-77 (1967).
80. Interestingly, incompetency and guardianship proceedings developed long before
the hospitalization of the mentally ill. By the first century B.C., Rome established "elabo-
rate provisions" to protect the property of the mentally ill. John Parry, Incompetency,
Guardianship, and Restoration, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 369 (3d ed.
1985). The Roman government, however, did not provide any help to the mentally ill
individual. Id.; see also Robert B. Fleming & Carolyn J. Robinson, Care of Incompetent
Adults: A Brief History of Guardianship, 30 Amz. ATr'Y 16 (1993).
81. Social scientists have found that social economic status is inversely correlated to
mental disorders. One review of the literature found that "psychopathology is at least two
and a half times more prevalent in the lowest social class than in the highest." Deborah
Belle, Poverty and Women's Health, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 385, 385 (1990).
82. JUDrrIH BELLIVEAU KRAuss, R.N. & ANN T. SLAvrNSKY, R.N., THE CHRONI-
CALLY ILL PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT AND THE COMMUNITY 83 (1982) (stating that 70% of
the 162 mental patients studied were dependent upon public funds within a year of hospital
release).
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cent of America's homeless are seriously mentally ill.83 Second, if the
courts truly desire to encourage guardians to be more responsible for
their wards, they could hold the guardians directly liable.8s Third, guardi-
ans must be informed of the law in order to be motivated to protect their
ward's estate. It is likely that most guardians believe that insanity is a
defense to a tort as it is in criminal law.
85
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Prior to 1970, there was no American court, with the exception of
courts in Louisiana,8 6 willing to soften the unequivocal rule that the men-
tally ill should be held to an objective standard in negligence actions.87
Although courts created many formulations of the bright line rule, the
reasons given for the objective standard almost always paralleled those
listed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'
In 1970, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Breunig v. American Family
Insurance Co.89 was the first court to hint that a subjective standard of
care should be applied to the mentally ill, albeit in dicta. In Breunig, the
defendant, Mrs. Veith, drove her car across a highway's dividing line and
into a pickup truck driven by the plaintiff.90 Mrs. Veith's liability insur-
ance company presented expert medical testimony demonstrating that
Mrs. Veith had been suffering from schizophrenia and acute paranoia at
the time of the accident and thus could not drive her car "with [a] con-
scious mind."91 Mrs. Veith's psychiatrist testified that Veith believed that
God was controlling her car and when she saw the truck coming she ac-
83. Dan Hurley, Imminent Danger, 27 PSYCHOL. TODAY, 54, 56 (1994) (The National
Alliance for the Mentally 11 estimates that 30% of the homeless, 150,000 people, are seri-
ously mentally disturbed.); John Q. La Fond, J.D., Law and the Delivery of Involuntary
Mental Health Services, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHrATRy 209, 217 (1994) ('Cu-rent studies
estimate that a quarter or a third of the homeless are seriously mentally ill.").
84. Siedelson, supra note 2, at 38.
85. Ague, supra note 2, at 222; Casto, supra note 2, at 717.
86. Louisiana upholds the civil rule that mental illness may be a defense to a tort
action. Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
87. Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338, 339, is a 1972 intentional tort case where the
Connecticut Court of Common Pleas wrote in dicta that the objective standard was out-
dated. Id at 339. Accordingly, the court was unwilling to adhere to this view. Id. How-
ever, when a defendant asserted mental illness as a defense to a negligence action, a
Connecticut court failed to follow the dicta of Fitzgerald. "lirner v. Caldwell, 421 A.2d 876
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1980).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1965).
89. 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970).
90. Id at 622.
91. Id.
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celerated in order to fly like Batman. 2 The psychiatrist also testified that
Veith had no notice of when her illness would occur and further ex-
plained that:
The origin of [Veith's] mental illness appeared in August, 1965,
prior to the accident. In that month Mrs. Veith visited the Nece-
dah Shrine where she was told the Blessed Virgin had sent her
to the shrine. She was told to pray for survival. Since that time
she felt it had been revealed to her the end of the world was
coming and that she was picked by God to survive. Later she
had visions of God judging people and sentencing them to
Heaven or Hell; she thought Batman was good and was trying to
help save the world .... I
After the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed
stating that, due to her mental illness, she should have been held to a
subjective standard of care.94 The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment, holding that the jury could have found that Veith's mental illness
was foreseeable. 9s The court, however, explained in dicta that there is no
bright line rule.96 Instead:
The question of liability in every case must depend on the kind
and nature of the insanity. The effect of the mental illness or
mental hallucinations or disorder must be such as to affect the
person's ability to understand and appreciate the duty which
rests upon him to drive his car with ordinary care, or if the in-
sanity does not affect such understanding and appreciation, it
must affect his ability to control his car in an ordinarily prudent
manner. And in addition, there must be an absence of notice or
forewarning to the person that he may be suddenly subject to such
a type of insanity or mental illness.97
Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court signaled its approval of the idea that
if mental incapacity is sudden and unforeseeable, the insane should not
92. Id.
93. IM. at 625.
94. Id. at 622-23.
95. The court stated:
The jury could find that a woman, who believed she had a special relationship to
God and was the chosen one to survive the end of the world, could believe that
God would take over the direction of her life to the extent of driving her car.
Since these mental aberrations were not constant, the jury could infer she had
knowledge of her condition and the likelihood of a hallucination just as one who
has knowledge of a heart condition knows the possibility of an attack.
I& at 625.
96. See id. at 623.
97. I& (emphasis added).
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be held to a reasonable person standard."
Anicet v. Gant,99 an intentional tort case, echoed Breunig's conclusion
that when harm cannot be prevented there is no fault, and consequently,
no liability. In Anicet, the defendant-appellant, Edgar Anicet, was a
twenty-three-year-old man who had been involuntarily committed to a
mental hospital for about two years.100 Anicet had suffered from life-
long mental illness which prevented him from controlling his acts of vio-
lence.10 1 He often threw rocks and other projectiles at people.0 2 The
plaintiff-appellee, Preston Gant, worked in the mental hospital as an at-
tendant. Gant worked in Anicet's ward, the ward where the hospital's
most dangerous and lowest functioning individuals were placed.' 3 On
the day in question, when plaintiff saw defendant Anicet throw a chair at
another patient, Gant tried to calm Anicet down and threatened to put
him in a quiet isolation room if he did not compose himself.104 While
Gant was leaving the room, Anicet threw a heavy ashtray at his head. In
trying to avoid the ashtray, Gant fell sharply to the ground and was se-
verely injured.'05
In reaching its decision, the court explained that Florida law clearly
held that all mentally ill individuals are liable "in the same generalized
way as is an ordinary person for both 'intentional' acts and 'negligent'
ones."'0 6 Nevertheless, the court refused to hold Anicet liable, finding
that the reasons asserted for this general rule were inapplicable when the
defendant was confined to a mental hospital.'07
The court held that public policy mandated a subjective standard in this
case.'08 First, it reasoned that the maxim, "where one of two innocent
persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned
it," was inapplicable in this case. 0 9 Gant was not an unsuspecting mem-
ber of society; instead, he was paid to interact with dangerous mental
patients.110 The court analogized this situation to the "fireman's rule.""'
98. See id at 624.
99. 580 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).






106. Id at 275 (citation omitted).
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id (citation omitted).
110. Id at 275-76.
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Given that society compensated Gant for the dangers he encountered
through his pay and workmen's compensation, he was not entitled to tort
recovery for his injuries." 2 Second, the court contended that imposing
liability on Gant would not encourage Anicet's relatives to safeguard
others from harm:
Anicet, his relatives, and society did as much as they could do
along these lines by confining him [Anicet] in the most re-
stricted area of a restricted institution that could be found.
Hence, it would serve no salutary purpose to impose the extra
financial burden of a tort recovery. As to the "fairness" issue, it
is likewise clear that the imposition of liability would in fact
counter our notions of what would be just to Anicet-who has
no control over his actions and is thus innocent of any wrongdo-
ing in the most basic sense of that term.113
Although the Florida Appeals Court limited its holding to individuals
confined to mental hospitals, the court's reasoning is equally persuasive
in all negligence cases where the plaintiff could not ex ante prevent the
harm caused due to mental illness.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a New Jersey trial court, in Stuy-
vesant Associates v. Doe,"4 established that failing to prevent a predict-
able psychotic episode constituted gross negligence.1 1 5 In this case, the
defendant, a forty-one-year-old tenant who was diagnosed as a schizo-
phrenic, had been receiving psychotropic injections (prolixine decanate)
regularly since 1980.116 The injections were to be given every two weeks.
However, the defendant missed one of his injections and subsequently
became psychotic." 7 In a delusional state he admittedly damaged the
landlord's property by spray-painting the stove, radiator, and window sill
in his apartment."' He also took a hammer and damaged another ten-
111. Id at 276. The Anicet court stated that the essence of the "fireman's rule" was that
"a person specifically hired to encounter and combat particular dangers is owed no in-
dependent tort duty by those who have created those dangers." ld Thus, where a fire-
man's job is to deal with the hazards of fires, "'he cannot complain of negligence in the
creation of the very occasion of his engagement."' Ide (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d
129, 131 (N.J. 1960)).
112. Id
113. Id
114. 534 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
115. In New Jersey, the difference between gross negligence and negligence is the level
of severity. Stuyvesant, 534 A.2d at 450.
116. Id at 449.
117. Id
118. Id at 450.
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ant's door."1 9 The landlord then brought a summary action for eviction
pursuant to New Jersey eviction law.12 This law allowed eviction when
the tenant caused damage to the landlord's property due to gross
negligence.121
The psychiatrist who testified for the defendant at trial explained that if
the defendant did not receive one of his injections, he would become
psychotic and delusional in a week to ten days."2 The psychiatrist also
testified that this transformation from rationality to psychosis happens
gradually, without the patient even realizing that it is occurring.1 23 As the
psychiatrist explained, the patient "hears the bells, but doesn't realize the
consequences., 1 24 The psychiatrist told the court that when the defend-
ant is in this delusional state he cannot control his own behavior but is
"driven by inner voices" and cannot distinguish between right and
wrong.
12
The court, nevertheless, rejected the defendant's defense of mental ill-
ness, holding:
A reasonable person under the same circumstances as this de-
fendant would be expected to get the injections as scheduled.
Not having done so, he allowed himself to become psychotic,
with the resulting damage done by his own hands. He is liable
for the consequences of that conduct. Perhaps he did not intend
to tempt the fate of becoming psychotic, or intend the damage
that resulted as a consequence, but it is obvious that he was the
person who allowed the condition to result, with the consequent
damage.
126
Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant violated the reason-
able person standard when he failed to prevent his impending
psychosis.
127
These relatively recent cases support the conclusion that the mentally
ill should be held to a reasonable person standard only when the mentally
ill individual can control her illness ex ante (i.e., the illness is both foresee-
119. 1d






126. IM at 450.
127. I&
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able and treatable). A subjective standard should be applied when the
mental illness is either sudden or untreatable.
III. NOVEL RATIONALES FOR THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD:
EFFICIENCY & THERAPEUTIC GOALS
While the traditional reasons for an objective standard appear to be
discredited, recent commentators have proposed that the objective stan-
dard promotes economic efficiency and therapeutic results. These con-
temporary rationales are only persuasive, however, when the mental
illness is both foreseeable and treatable.
A. The Goal of Economic Efficiency
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner in their book, The Eco-
nomic Structure of Tort Law,2 8 argue that the common law of torts pro-
motes economic efficiency,' 29 thereby minimizing accident losses and
prevention costs. Landes and Posner refer to their theory as the positive
economic theory of tort law. 130 The positive economic theory of tort law
defines economic efficiency as wealth maximization. 131 It occurs when
"winners from the [policy] change could compensate the losers, that is, if
the winners gain more from the change than the losers lose, whether or
not there is actual compensation.' 
32
Landes and Posner advocate that the common law's treatment of men-
tally ill tortfeasors generally leads to economic efficiency.133 A contrary
result will arise in one instance, when the mental illness appears suddenly
and unforeseeably.134 In order to analyze Landes and Posner's reason-
ing, one must first understand their economic analysis of the objective
and subjective standard of care.
According to Posner and Landes, the tradeoffs between the objective
and subjective standards support two predictions:
1. When the cost of determining the individual's due care level
is low, a departure from that level is more likely to be allowed.
This cost is presumably a function of how far the individual's
optimal care level deviates from the standard level: the wider
128. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3.
129. Id at 312-13.
130. Id at 15.
131. Id at 16.
132. Id.
133. Id at 126-31.
134. Id at 130.
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the gap, the more easily discoverable it will be by the methods
of litigation.
2. The more easily substitutable a reduction in activity is for an
increase in care, the less likely is the tort system to allow depar-
tures from a single, uniform due care level.
135
The standard as applied to blind people exemplifies these tradeoffs.'
36
There are low information costs for the court to determine whether the
individual is blind; that is, blindness is easy to determine and verify.
When the activity is a daily activity like walking across the street or tak-
ing the bus, the blind person cannot easily replace this activity with a less
risky one without incurring substantial costs. For instance, if the blind
person became a recluse to avoid these activities, she would likely lose
her job and social network while bearing additional costs such as hiring
someone to do her grocery shopping. Presumably, the marginal cost of
becoming a recluse would far exceed the marginal benefit of accident re-
duction. In the case of a blind individual walking to and from work, the
court can easily determine that the plaintiff's optimal standard of care is
below the reasonable person standard,'37 and there is no readily available
substitute for the activity in question. Thus, the positive economic theory
of tort law would apply the subjective standard. On the other hand, when
someone participates in an activity where a safer substitute is easily avail-
able, the positive economic theory of tort law would hold the person to
an objective standard of care. For instance, if a blind person decides to
drive a bus instead of ride the bus, the court is likely to hold the blind
person to the reasonable person standard.
When Posner and Landes explain the appropriate due care standard for
the mentally ill, they compare it to the level of due care required of chil-
dren.138 The costs for the court to determine if one is mentally ill are
rather high, especially in comparison to the information costs of deter-
mining if one is a child. Posner and Landes also argue that individuals
whose mental illness is serious enough to affect their capability to avoid
accidents are highly dangerous, and therefore, the costs to society of con-
fining these people is lower than the costs of integrating them into soci-
135. Id at 126.
136. Id. at 127.
137. The American Law Institute advocated differentiating between physical and
mental disabilities. "The explanation for the distinction between such physical illness and
the mental illness dealt with in § 283B probably lies in the greater public familiarity with
the former, and the comparative ease and certainty with which it can be proved." RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965) (emphasis added).
138. LANDES & PosNER, supra note 3, at 128-29.
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ety.' 39 In contrast, the cost of preventing children from participating in
every day activities (i.e., biking and playing on playgrounds) is greater
than the benefits of reducing accidents.140 This is the case because almost
all childhood activities present some risk of accident, and therefore, one
would have to eliminate virtually all childhood activities in order to lower
accident risk. 4' The cost of this elimination would be very high. Posner
and Landes conclude that an objective standard for children "would
make sense only if the optimal care of children, as of the dangerously
insane, involved constant restraint."' 42
However, Landes and Posner do not believe that the reasonable due
care standard is appropriate when mental illness is sudden and unforesee-
able.' 43 They contend that Breunig was correctly decided. 144 Landes and
Posner explain: "The difference between Breunig and the usual insanity
is that when insanity comes on and causes injury without any warning,
there is no opportunity to avoid the injury by restraining the insane per-
son."'145 Where Landes and Posner are mistaken is that they fail to real-
ize that the Breunig exception is also appropriate when mental illness is
foreseeable and untreatable. Landes and Posner do not reach this con-
clusion because they work from two misguided assumptions.
First, they assume that persons with a mental illness severe enough to
prevent them from meeting the reasonable person standard are confined
to institutions.'" This assumption, however, ignores civil commitment
laws. The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson147 held that "[a]
finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking up a per-
son against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial con-
finement.' 48 Using O'Connor as precedent, most lower courts have held
that the state may only involuntarily commit an individual when it is
found that she is dangerous to herself or others.' 49 Mere proclivity to
commit torts is not enough.
139. Id
140. Id.
141. I& at 129.
142. I&
143. I. at 130.
144. See id.
145. Id
146. "[P]eople whose insanity is severe enough to affect their ability to avoid physical
injury to themselves and others are generally kept under restraint." Id at 128.
147. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
148. I& at 575.
149. State v. Metz, 645 A.2d 965, 971 (Conn. 1994); Georgia Mental Health Inst. v.
Brady, 436 S.E.2d 219, 223 (Ga. 1993); In re Schumaker, 633 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ill. App. Ct.
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Studies confirm that most seriously mentally ill individuals are not in-
stitutionalized.150 As one commentator explains, "[m]any of our modem
institutions for the mentally ill exist in the open air: parks, alleys, vacant
lots, [and] steam grates on our city pavements."' 51 Since the deinstitu-
tionalization movement began in 1963, the number of individuals in
mental hospitals has fallen from 552,150 in 1952 to 68,000 today.'5 2 This
may explain why more than twice as many schizophrenics and manic
depressives reside in homeless shelters or on the street than live in state
mental hospitals. 53 A landmark study has found that only 900,000 of the
1.7 to 2.4 million chronically mentally ill individuals'5 4 in this country are
institutionalized at any time. 5 Approximately 1.5 million of the chroni-
cally mentally ill live in the community. 56
Second, Landes and Posner assume that the optimal arrangement for
the mentally ill is confinement. However, society, through its civil com-
mitment laws and funding for psychiatric institutions, has expressed a
consensus that it is only optimal to confine someone if she is a danger to
herself or others. Mental health professionals also reject Landes and Pos-
ner's assumption that total institutionalization provides the optimal mode
of treatment.1
57
In conclusion, it is economically efficient to hold the mentally ill indi-
1994); In re Winters, 627 N.E.2d 410,413 (III. App. Ct. 1994); Williams v. Commonwealth,
444 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Hurley, supra note 83, at 56.
150. See, e.g., Alexander Gralnick, M.D., L.F., Future of the Chronic Schizophrenic Pa-
tient: Predication and Recommendation, 40 AM. J. PsYc1oTmERAlY 419 (1986) (arguing
that the seriously mentally ill are often neglected because they do not meet the legal stan-
dard for commitment).
151. RAEL J. IsAAc & ViRmnIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN Tm STreEms: How PsYCHiA-
TRY & THE LAW ABANDONED Tim MENTALLY ILL 1 (1990).
152. Hurley, supra note 83, at 56.
153. Id.
154. The study defines "the chronically mentally ill" generally as persons who suffer
certain mental or emotional disorders (eg., organic brain syndrome, schizophrenia, recur-
rent depressive and manic-depressive disorders, and paranoid and other psychoses, plus
other disorders that may become chronic) that erode or prevent the development of their
functional capacities in relation to such primary aspects of daily life as self-care, interper-
sonal relationships, and work or schooling, and that often necessitate prolonged hospital
care. Howard H. Goldman et al., Defining and Counting the Chronically Mentally Ill, 32
Hosp. & CoMMUNITY PsYCaIATRY 21,22 (1981).
155. ld
156. Bloche & Cournos, supra note 54, at 388.
157. Splane, supra note 4, at 161 ("Community treatment is thought to reduce the time
patients spend hospitalized; to reduce readmission rates by providing alternate services in
the community; and to allow chronic patients to return to the community, where they are
likely to be happier and better adjusted.") (citations omitted).
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vidual to a reasonable care standard only when their disease is both treat-
able and foreseeable. In all other cases, the actor is incapable of avoiding
injury. Therefore, imposing liability cannot lead to efficiency.
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
The school of therapeutic jurisprudence contends that the mental
health disciplines should be consulted in order to design laws that pro-
mote positive therapeutic results. 58 It examines whether substantive
rules, legal procedures, and the roles of lawyers and judges produce ther-
apeutic results.159 The ultimate goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to
empirically test whether the law leads to therapeutic outcomes.
According to commentator Stephanie Splane, 6 ° the reasonable person
standard acts as a therapeutic agent and therefore should be maintained.
She contends that the objective standard encourages community accept-
ance of the mentally ill161 and promotes their self-sufficiency.162 With an
objective standard, the public will be encouraged to provide the mentally
ill with housing, licenses, and employment because they know that the
mentally ill will not be absolved of tort liability. Ideally, this integration
of the mentally ill into mainstream society will decrease the social stigma
of mental illness. "Correspondingly, if the mentally ill were allowed to
escape tort liability, there is a risk that the public might become outraged
by the perceived injustice of denying compensation to innocent
victims.'
' 63
This integration theory assumes that individuals are willing to incur tor-
tious injury as long as they are assured that they will be monetarily com-
pensated for this injury. However, actors may rationally choose to forgo
the possibility of harm by not interacting with the mentally ill."6 The
158. The main tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence are described in DAVID B. WEXLER,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: ThE LAW AS A THERAPEtrnc AGENT (1990); DAVID B.
WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991); Richard
L. Weiner, Social Analytic Jurisprudence & Tort Law: Social Cognition Goes To Court, 37
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 503 (1993).
159. WEXLER & WiNiCK, supra note 158, at 8.
160. Splane, supra note 4, at 153.
161. Id. at 164-66.
162. Id. at 163-64.
163. Id at 167 (footnote omitted).
164. Studies on whether the mentally ill are more likely to be in accidents are inconclu-
sive. Matthew J. Edlund et al., Accidents Among Schizophrenic Outpatients, 30 CoMPmR-
HENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 522, 525 (1989) ("The relative risk of a motor vehicle accident per
mile appears to be about double for those schizophrenic patients who drive [compared to
the control group.]"); J.L. Armstrong and F.A. Whitlock, Mental Illness and Road Traffic
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integration theory rests on the improbable scenario that individuals will
choose harm and potential tort recovery over ex ante avoidance of the
harm.
Secondly, Splane argues that a uniform objective standard would en-
courage the mentally ill to become responsible, full members of soci-
ety.165 As evidence, the commentator cites research indicating that the
mentally ill are afraid to go to court. Thus, Splane hypothesizes that the
mentally ill would become more conscientious to avoid court. 66 Yet,
only the mentally ill who have control over their actions can be deterred.
When mental illness is sudden or nontreatable, deterrence is impossi-
ble.' 67 Consequently, the second prong of Splane's analysis fails.
It is unclear why Splane argues for a uniform rule. The first prong of
Splane's analysis is based on a questionable assumption and the second
prong has only limited applicability. Indeed, it would appear that
Splane's analysis is better suited to support the rule that an objective
standard should apply when the mentally ill have control over their ac-
tions and thus can be deterred.
A second advocate of therapeutic jurisprudence, Daniel W. Shuman,
contends that a limited objective standard can encourage utilization of
the mental health system. 6 Shuman asserts that the objective standard
promotes therapeutic outcomes by informing the mentally ill that their
mental illness will not excuse them from liability. 69 To encourage the
initiation of treatment, Shuman proposes to apply the subjective standard
to defendants who have started treatment prior to committing the tort.
He states, "[i]f obtaining treatment is a reasonable response to notice of
the mental illness, then obtaining treatment should be factored into the
Accidents, 14 Ausmr.. & N.Z. J. PsYCHiATRY 53,56-57 (1980) ("Apart from the diagnosis of
schizophrenia, none of the other categories of illness showed a significantly greater or
lesser [traffic] accident frequency."); Robert C. Eelkema, M.D. et al., A Statistical Study on
the Relationship Between Mental illness and Traffic Accidents-A Pilot Study, 60 AM. J.
PUBi. HEALTH 459, 462, 468 (1970). "Psychotics and psychoneurotics tend to have better
[driving] records than their matched comparison on group after discharge." Id. at 468.
Individuals with personality disorders had a higher traffic accident rate than their matched
counterpart. Id. at 462.
165. Splane, supra note 4, at 166-69.
166. Id. at 166 n.70.
167. It is not even clear whether tort law deters anyone. See Daniel W. Shuman, The
Psychology of Deterrence In Tort Law, 42 KAN. L. REv. 115, 167 (1993). "[N]one of the
mainstream theories of human behavior support the likelihood that tort sanctions appro-
priately deter unsafe behavior." Id.
168. Shuman, supra note 4, at 419-20.
169. Id. at 419.
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measurement of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.' 7 Shu-
man envisions a two-tier test to effectuate his theory:
[T]he first conjunctive element of the test is that the defendant
must have instituted treatment in good faith prior to the injury-
producing conduct. If the defendant did not initiate treatment
prior to the injury-producing conduct, the defendant would not
be judged on the modified standard of care, but instead, on the
traditional objective standard of care-no therapeutic efforts,
no special therapeutic jurisprudence standard.' 7 '
If the fact-finder determines that the first part of the test is satisfied, then
she should consider "whether the defendant performed as well as society
is entitled to expect such person to behave, considering their mental or
emotional problem and the treatment obtained."' 72
In support of his limited objective standard, Shuman cites case law,
including Breunig, which applied the subjective standard when the de-
fendant's negligence was caused by a sudden and unpredictable episode
of mental illness.173 Nevertheless, Shuman does not address why his own
test would hold those inflicted with a sudden, unexpected mental illness
to the reasonable person standard. Furthermore, individuals whose
mental illness is not amenable to treatment are held to the objective stan-
dard. If Shuman's goal is to encourage therapeutic results, why must he
punish those who cannot be helped by therapy?174 The problems with
Shuman's limited objective standard can be rectified by eliminating the
first prong of his test. The limited objective standard should be based
upon whether the defendant performed as well as society is entitled to
expect such person to behave considering her mental or emotional
problems and the treatment obtained.
IV. HARMONIZING NEGLIGENCE LAW: YOUTH, PHYSICAL MALADIES,
AND MENTAL ILLNESS
A. Children
Children and those who suffer sudden physical illness are readily ex-
cused from the reasonable person standard. The same standard, how-
170. Id at 425.
171. Id at 426 (footnote omitted).
172. Id at 428.
173. Id. at 425.
174. Research has found that most individuals with long-term psychiatric illnesses expe-
rience periods of remission and exacerbation regardless of whether treatment is employed.
KRAuss & SLAVINSKY, supra note 82, at 131.
Asking the Impossible
ever, is not applicable to the mentally ill. Children are generally held to a
subjective standard in negligence actions.175 Children's actions are mea-
sured against those of a reasonable child of like age, intelligence, and
experience. 176 In Dorais v. Paquin,'177 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court explained that "[c]hildren generally do not have the same capacity
to perceive, appreciate and avoid dangerous situations which is possessed
by the ordinary, prudent adult. ',17  Thus, the law should recognize by
analogy that when a mentally ill individual is incapable of exercising rea-
sonable care, it would be inconsistent to require them to compensate
others.179
B. Sudden Physical Illness
When stricken suddenly with a physical illness, one is not held to a
purely objective standard. In Hammontree v. Jenner, s° for example, the
court refused to hold an epileptic driver on medication'81 liable when he
had a seizure while driving.182 The court's reasoning in Hammontree re-
sembled Oliver Wendell Holmes' criticism of strict liability:
The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must
lie where it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that
a human being is the instrument of misfortune .... If this were
not so, any act would be sufficient, however remote, which set in
motion or opened the door for a series of physical consequences
ending in damage .... Nay, why need an act at all, and why is it
not enough that his existence has been at the expense of the
plaintiff? The requirement of an act is the requirement that the
defendant should have made a choice. But the only possible
purpose of introducing this moral element is to make the power
of avoiding the evil complained of a condition of liability. There
175. Children are held to a reasonable care standard when they participate in activities
normally conducted by adults such as driving a car. REsTATaMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 283A cmt. c (1965).
176. Id at § 283A.
177. 304 A.2d 369 (N.H. 1973).
178. Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
179. Bohlen, supra note 2, at 31; Cook, supra note 2, at 349; Ellis, supra note 2, at 1102-
06.
180. 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Ct. App. 1971).
181. Note that in the civil setting, the courts predicate liability based on failure to take
medication. Thus, the courts could predicate civil liability on the fact that a psychiatric
patient does not take her psychotropic drugs. Although in a criminal setting the state may
not require one to take mind altering drugs, it is fully consistent for tort law to predicate
liability on this failure.
182. Hammontree, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
1995]
92 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:67
is no such power where the evil cannot be foreseen.'
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It is difficult to think of a reason to differentiate sudden physical illness
from sudden mental illness."l 4 Indeed, a large group of psychiatrists be-
lieve that mental illness is biologically based just as physical illness. In
this day and age, when mental illness is sudden, one should not be held to
the objective standard of care.
V. CONCLUSION
Originally, tort law was predicated on strict liability. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries strict liability was replaced with liability predi-
cated on fault. The last remnants of seventeenth century strict liability
law remains with us in the area of mental illness. Mentally ill individuals
whose disease is sudden or untreatable are liable for the negligent harm
that they occasioned even when they cannot avoid the harm. To close
this area of strict liability, a subjective standard should be applied to men-
tally ill individuals who cannot avoid causing negligent harm due to their
mental illness. Clearly, mentally ill individuals whose disease is sudden or
untreatable cannot ex ante prevent the harm and thus should not be
found culpable.
183. 0. W. HOLMES, JR., Trm COMMON LAW 94-95 (1881).
184. Similarly, psychic harm is well accepted in the psychiatric community; however,
tort law maintains skeptical of what it cannot physically see.
[T]he overwhelming majority of jurisdictions refuse to permit a person injured
psychically by another's conduct to recover for his psychic injury unless some sort
of physical injury ensues. Second, in cases where the defendant's physical injury
of a third party caused the plaintiff's psychic injury, the so-called by-stander cases,
many jurisdictions deny the plaintiff recovery for his psychic injury unless he was
in the zone of physical danger created by the defendant's culpable conduct.
Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L.
REv. 333, 336 (1984) (citations omitted).
